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The South African perspective of IBSA

Romy Chevallier, EU-Africa Researcher - South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg
(27/11/07)

South Africa has become increasingly aware of the power shifts taking place in the global system and is therefore attempting to play a more proactive role in addressing global governance constraints and inequalities. South Africa supports the view that the emerging South can collectively push for a more equitable global order with the redistribution of power between North and South, while at the same time addressing Africa’s development challenges and concerns. In this respect, IBSA provides a valuable informal forum or platform of discussion and co-operation between three democracies sharing common values and concerns. The leverage and combined weight of these three countries is unprecedented in any previous examples of South–South co-operation.

South African government has reaffirmed the IBSA Dialogue as an important mechanism for political consultations and co-ordination on important regional and global developments. However, despite IBSA’s initial raison d’etre (political co-operation and UN Security Council reform) the relations between the member states are often centred on potential economic linkages on a bilateral or trilateral level. Logistics and trade facilitation, for example, have emerged as a priority and the alliance is looking for new areas to extend its previous success around multilateral trade issues.

There has also been new impetus toward alternatives for development, and economic reform has emerged in trilateral discussions. In this regard — with an emphasis on alternatives for rapid economic growth — IBSA does suggest alternatives to the currently accepted economic orthodoxy, debunking some of the approaches to development advocated by credit lending agencies and countries of the North for the developing world. IBSA members are becoming increasingly aware of their role as development partners and have recently set up a Development Fund under the IBSA framework.

The most recent IBSA Summit, held in South Africa in October 2007, has revealed continued commitment to the five Memoranda of Understanding have been signed on agriculture and allied fields, bio-fuels, merchant shipping and other maritime transport, trade facilitation and a framework for cooperation on information society. There are currently 14 sectoral working groups operating within the Forum, ranging from climate change, human settlement development, to health and corruption. The agenda is ambitious.

South Africa’s foreign policy has seen various shifts since the end of apartheid. From 1999 onwards, the Mbeki Presidency has been characterised by a greater emphasis on African concerns, and has favoured an approach that is African-led and African-owned. Mbeki’s approach clearly outlines South Africa’s priority to its region, but also includes the strengthening of political and economic linkages with countries of the South. South-South co-operation models somehow often offer a more democratic and viable alternative to South Africa than enhanced alliances with the North. This has been evident in South Africa’s accelerated engagement with ‘new’ partners on the continent, such as China, India and Brazil, as well as within forums such as Non- aligned Movement, Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership and Trilateral Forum such as IBSA.

South Africa has thus increased its cooperation with these countries at both the bilateral and multilateral level, aiming to use these alliances at a global level to enhance the development of its immediate region.

It must be remembered that South Africa is indeed a ‘minor’ in comparison to other IBSA members. SA has a relatively small economy ($212 billion) and a population of approximately 47 million. Where South Africa gains its strategic importance and relevance is within its position on the continent. If South Africa’s leadership in Africa was undermined by its own actions or by external forces, South Africa’s role globally would diminish. South Africa’s hegemonic status in Africa is premised on its superior economic and military strength, and remains a source of discomfort both for the ruling ANC and other large African states which see themselves as much as rivals. It is thus imperative that South Africa plays a delicate balancing act between the competing priorities of its foreign policy. However, South Africa’s pre-eminence as an important partner for non-African actors (India, Brazil, China) is also sensitive and must not be seen to prioritise its foreign policy agenda over Africa.

Considering these points, it is important to pose a few questions:

  • How does South Africa balance the competing priorities on its foreign policy? namely; Bilateral relations, African agenda, Southern alliances and North-South dialogue
  • The importance of South-South alliances in facilitating South Africa’s regional obligations?
  • Will there be continuity in South Africa’s foreign policy post Mbeki, particularly with regards to the prioritization of Southern alliances?